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ABSTRACT
This thesis analyzes the process used to transfer U.S. Navy Perry class
frigates to Turkey and issues raised during this transfer process. Up to the final
step, this transfer was representative of most U.S. rnilitary equipment transfers.
The relations between allied countries depend heavily on the mutual support they
provide to each other. Strong relations create strong mutual support, or vice versa.
Although the FMS/FML process is a very effective process for ship transfers,
political issues must never be underestimated. As the Cold War came to an end,
the mutual threat had changed, affecting alliances and rephrasing the causes of
their existence. The effect of this change has caused more domestic oriented
policies to predominate within a country's political system.
Although this policy change didn't cause procedural changes in regulations
and rules, the application of the decisions given and approved by the highest
executive and legislative branch authorities are now more subjective and seem
unpredictable. Long term and continuous repetition of this behavior could cause
negative impact on alliances.
VI
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION 1
A. BACKGROUND 1
B. THESIS OBJECTIVES 3
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 3
1. Primary 3
2. Secondary 3
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATION OF RESEARCH 4
E. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 4
II. CURRENT FMS POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR THE
TRANSFER OF U.S. NAVY VESSELS TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES 5
A. HISTORY 5
B. U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS 8
C. THE FMS PROCESS 10
1. Letter of Request 11
2. Request for SME 13
3. All Other FMS (non-SME) 13
D. U.S. GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS 13
1. Executive Branch 13
2. Legislative Branch 14
3. Judicial Branch 16
E. SECURITY ASSISTANCE (SA) RELATED TO
AUTHORIZATION AND APPROPRIATION ACTS 16
1. Authorization Acts 16
2. Appropriations Act 17
F. CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION 17
1. Foreign Military Sales/Leases 17
2. Congressional Joint Resolutions 19
H. SUMMARY 19
Vll
III. THE U.S. NAVY TRANSFER PROGRAM AND "PERRY" CLASS
FRIGATE TRANSFER PROCESS TO TURKEY 21
A. THE U.S. NAVY SHIP TRANSFER PROGRAM 21
1. General 21
2. Ship Transfer Policies 21
3. The Transfer Authorities 23
4. Methodology of Ship Transfers 24
5. The Transfer Process 25
B. BACKGROUND ON SHIP TRANSFERS TO TURKEY 32
C. THE INITIATION OF THE "PERRY" TRANSFER
TO TURKEY 32
D. TRANSFER PROCESS 33
1. Work Definition Conferences (WDC) 33
2. Legislative and Congressional Process and Outcomes 35
E. SUMMARY 40
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE TRANSFER PROCESS WITH RESPECT
TO THE FMS PROCEDURES 41
A. INITIATION OF THE TRANSFER PROCESS 41
B. SHIP INSPECTIONS AND TURKEY'S FORMAL
COMMITMENT 41
C. REVISION OF THE TRANSFER AGREEMENT 42
D. CONGRESSIONAL PROCESS 42
1. Transfer Authorization Bills 42
2. Congressional Notification 43
E. THE DISPUTE OVER THE KARDAK ISLETS IN
AEGEAN SEA 44
1. A Brief Explanation of the Crisis 44
2. A Bill Introduced to the U.S. Senate 45
F. THE FINAL STEP YET TO COME 46
V CONCLUSION 47
A. CONCLUSION 47
B. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 48
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 49
viii
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1. Two Channels of Request for Significant
Military Equipment (SME) 12
Figure 2. United States Government Organization
for Security Assistance 15
Figure 3. Flowchart ofAECA Advance Sales
Reporting Provisions 18
Figure 4a. Transfer Process 26
Figure 4b. Transfer Process (Cont.) 27
Figure 5. Title 10, U.S. Code, Article 7307 31
Figure 6. Initiation of the Transfer Process 34
Figure 7a. Transfer Process 36
Figure 7b. Transfer Process (Cont.) 37
IX

I. INTRODUCTION
A. BACKGROUND
As an expected outcome of global polarization and political conflicts raised
between individual countries or pacts of different views, arms sales have become
increasingly important during the last century. As the importance of deterrence
has been extended beyond the borders of the countries and pacts have become
important organizations to counter the threat, especially after the World War II, the
rate of arming has dramatically increased throughout the world. Besides the
requirement for providing deterrence, exchange of arms has become an important
political tool for international affairs. While arms sales increase the receiving
countries national defense, it also decreases the risk of a possible conflict. At the
same time, closer relations are developed between the trading countries. Arms
sales buy influence and unseen leverage, which is accumulated for use at critical
times when the supplier nation needs support from foreign nations. 1
Although the cold war has come to an end, the unstabilized governments of
those countries in the process of democratization and regional conflicts caused by
nationalism, racism or religious reasons are keeping the demand high for more
sophisticated weapons. This demand is causing continuing scientific and
technological innovations to produce more destructive, more accurate and more
numerous weapons systems. Although the developing countries do not have
sufficient economic resources for the establishment of an advanced domestic arms
industry, they still require technologically advanced weapon systems for self
defense purposes. Although there are numerous agreements to decrease nuclear
arms stockpiles between the super powers, conventional arms transfers continue to
1
A. Karaahmet, An Appraisal of U.S. Security Assistance to Turkey Between 1950 and 1992 , p.
1, Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, June 1994.
1
play an increasingly important part in promoting international and regional
stability while enhancing the security of allies. Thus, countries will continue to
purchase required military weaponry from international sources.
Beginning with World War I the United States became one of the major
arms suppliers for its allies. First, the U.S. provided arms on a " grant aid" basis.
Later, when the recipient countries made significant economic progress, " sales"
replaced "grant aid." Subsequent to the end of the cold war and the formal
dissolution of the U.S.S.R., Russia's arms agreements lessened, while the U.S.
remained the undisputed leader in arms sales to the world. Today, the U.S.
accounts for 38% of world arms exports. While the U.S. is the most prolific
exporter of arms, arms production outside the U.S. especially in Western Europe
and developing countries is increasing both in scope and sophistication. Also, the
expansion of arms production in the developing countries since the end of the
World War II has been quite extensive.
Currently, the transfer of military weaponry from the U.S. to other
countries is done in three basic ways: grants, loans, and sales (military or
commercial). To implement such world-wide transfers via the Sales Program, the
United States developed the concept of " Security Assistance." This covers a
broad range of programs which employ funding and the legal authority to provide
defense articles and training, economic support, and peacekeeping assistance to
key friends and allies. In order to monitor these programs, the United States has
established subcommittees within Congress and organizations within the
Departments of Defense and State. 3
2
0. Saruhan, An Analysis Of Foreign Military Sales Procedures , p. 2, Master's Thesis, Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 1989.
3
A. Karaahmet, p. 3.
U.S. security assistance programs assisted Turkey today with modernizing
its armed forces. A decade ago, Turkey embarked upon an intensive program to
modernize its armed forces to bring them in line with emerging technologies and
NATO requirements. The political and military leadership of Turkey has made it
abundantly clear that they place a high priority on ensuring that the Turkish Armed
Forces remain completely capable and fully prepared to carry out its national
defense mission, its NATO missions, and any future requests by the United
Nations in its many peace-keeping roles. Turkey is currently working on a
program to transfer Perry Class Frigates to the Turkish Navy to modernize it under
the security assistance umbrella of the U.S.
B. THESIS OBJECTIVE
The objective of this thesis is to describe and analyze the Foreign Military
Sales/Lease (FMS/FML) procurement process and policy for the transfer of U.S.
naval vessels to foreign governments under the "Security Assistance" program.
The focus will be on the FMS process and the reasons which caused the delay
during the transfer process of three Perry Class Frigates to Turkey. The research
and analysis involved in this thesis will contribute to the knowledge needed by
foreign officers who will work in conjunction with U.S. officials engaged in the
transfers of U.S. naval vessels in the future.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. Primary
What are the reasons that caused at least, one year delay in the transfer of
the three Perry Class Frigates to Turkey?
2. Secondary
a. What is the Security Assistance Program and what are the current
FMS/FML ship transfer methods and procedures used for the
transfer of ex-U.S. Navy vessels to friendly and allied countries?
b. What are the congressional constraints on the FMS/FML transfer
process and what are the issues between legislative and executive
authorities?
c. How was the transfer of the three Perry Class frigates to Turkey
initiated and how did the process evolve?
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATION OF RESEARCH
The scope of this thesis is limited to the United States Foreign Military
Sales/Lease (FMS/FML) Policy for the transfer of naval vessels to foreign
governments; the U.S. agencies concerned with the transfer and the procedures
that are used in the process. This thesis identifies causes for the delay during the
transfer of three Perry Class Frigates to Turkey.
E. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
Chapter I discusses the background and objectives of the thesis.
Chapter II introduces the concept of Security Assistance and explains the
history of the U.S. system for arms sales approval.
Chapter HI discusses the policies and procedures for FMS/FML of U.S.
naval vessels to foreign governments, using the transfer decision of three Perry
Class Frigates to Turkey as an example.
Chapter IV presents an analysis of the current FMS procedures with respect
to the transfer of the Perry Class Frigates to Turkey. Both problematic issues
concerning the transfer and lessons learned from the procurement process are
discussed.
Chapter V concludes the thesis and presents recommendations.
H. CURRENT FMS POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR THE
TRANSFER OF U.S. NAVY VESSELS TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES
A. HISTORY
Weapon sales and arms transfers among all countries of the world have
increased and reached new levels since the end of World War II and during the
cold war era. Arms sales have become an important business and have an
important impact on the international relations. It was after World War II that,
Soviet diplomatic pressure became a concern for President Truman in the United
States and he felt the spread of communism was a threat to Anatolia, the Turkish
Straits, Balkans and the Persian Gulf. As a result of his doctrine, Truman
proposed to Congress a military aid package for Turkey. In his address to
Congress, President Truman stated:
I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support
free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed
minorities or by outside pressure. I believe that we must assist free
peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way. I believe
that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid
which is essential to economic stability and orderly political
processes.
4
The Foreign Military Assistance Program was established by the passage of
this legislation and it also served as a basis for the creation of the Foreign Military
Sales Program. In 1948, Secretary of State George Marshall proposed heavy
American aid to help Europe recover from the demolished economy caused by
World War EL Congress accepted the request and established the European
Recovery Plan (ERP), or Marshall Plan, offering assistance to 16 nations in
Western Europe. This plan, however, did not include Turkey.
5
4
David J. Schumacher, The Management of Security Assistance, p. 14, The Defense Institute of
Security Assistance Management, Dayton, OH, 1994.
5
Ibid. p. 15.
5
In 1948, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was established.
This made the Security Assistance Programs even more important. Because
NATO was created to be a bulwark against communist expansion in Western
Europe, its existence forced allies to increase assistance to member nations,
including Turkey.
Security Assistance increased during the Eisenhower years. While he was
President, Eisenhower initiated a request regarding assistance to some Middle
Eastern nations against external armed aggression from a communist threat.
Congress approved Eisenhower's proposal by joint resolution on March 9, 1957.
Eisenhower's belief was that the loss of the Middle East to "international
communism" would constitute a severe and fatal blow to American interests. This
policy continued through the mid- 1960 's, with allies receiving approximately 56
percent of all American arms via the Military Assistance Program. 6
On October 22, 1968, Congress enacted the Foreign Military Sales Act,
which consolidated into a single act all legislation to authorize sales of arms by the
United States to allies and friendly foreign countries. In initiating this legislation,
Congress declared that the ultimate goal of the United States was a world which
was free from war and the dangers of arms expansion. Furthermore, United States
policy encouraged regional arms control and discouraged arms races. This
legislation also shifted emphasis from the Military Assistance Program to Foreign
Military Sales.
Foreign assistance and sales to Europe focused on Turkey, Greece, and
Portugal in support ofNATO and a U.S. defense agreement with Spain for use of
Spanish bases. Turkey also received sizable financial support in recognition of its
continuing economic needs.
'Tbid. p. 16.
President Reagan's policy assumed that arms transfers could help deter
aggression from neighboring countries. Under this policy, each request for arms
was reviewed on a case-by-case basis, primarily in terms of its contribution to
deterrence and defense.
The arms transfer and overall security assistance policies of the Bush
Administration were a continuation of those which evolved during the Reagan
Presidency. However, the following events were but a few that occurred
throughout the world which had a significant impact on U.S. foreign policy and
security assistance.
1. The collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1989 and the
subsequent emergence of democracy in most former Warsaw Pact
countries;
2. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, followed by Operation
Desert Storm in January/February 1991;
3. The worldwide economic recession of 1991 and 1992; and,
4. The Middle East peace talks, resulting in the establishment of
Palestine as a country in 1996.
Despite these significant world problems, the Clinton Ao^nmistration's
initial emphasis was on rebuilding the U.S. economy and establishing a
predominantly domestic agenda. In terms of foreign policy and national security
interests, there was little departure from the previously stated goals of building
democracy, promoting and maintaining peace, promoting economic growth,
sustainable development, addressing global problems, and meeting urgent
humanitarian needs.
With the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union,
the focus shifted toward attaining peace dividends in the form of reduced defense
budgets and the rapid downsizing of the U.S. military force structure. The savings
7
Ibid. p. 25.
gained would help to fund certain domestic programs such as reducing the budget
deficit and funding a health care reform package. As had been the trend in
previous years, the amount of money funded for major security assistance
programs declined during the Clinton administration. Congress significantly
reduced the Foreign Military Financing Program (FMFP), and encouraged
embassies to actively assist U.S. marketing efforts overseas.
Although the U.S. has continued to be the foremost arms exporter to the
world, FMS support has fluctuated depending on the administration in power.
However, FMS has been, and still is, one of the most important security assistance
programs used by Turkey to modernize and maintain its armed forces. Turkey was
appropriated $358 million of Foreign Military Financing in 1996, from a total
appropriation of $12. 1 billion foreign aid program for FY1996.
B. U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
U.S. Security Assistance covers a broad range of programs which employ
funding and the legal authority to provide defense equipment, training, economic
support, and peace-keeping assistance to key friends and allies. The definition of
"Security Assistance" is:
Groups of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as
amended, and other related statutes by which the U.S. provides
defense articles, military training, and other defense related services,
by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in the furtherance of national
policies and objectives. 9
In general, the U.S. offers security assistance to strengthen the national
security of friendly nations, and to support existing or prospective democratic
U.S. Anns Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers
(1991-1992). p. 13, Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, March 1994.
9
U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Chief of Staff Publication, Dictionary of Military and
Associated Terms, p. 327, Washington, DC, Government Printing Office, 1987.
8
institutions and market economies. Since World War II, it has become an
institutionalized and continuing program used to advance U.S. interests in a global
environment.
It's not just a short range program; rather, it's a continuing program, the
components and magnitude of which change each year due to U.S. national
interests and foreign policy objectives. With the President's Congressional
Presentation Document (CPD) for Security Assistance (SA) programs, these
objectives are:
1. Building democracy through support of free and fair elecrives,
respect for human rights, the rule of law and economic opportunity.
2. Promoting and maintaining peace by supporting peacekeeping
efforts, assisting friendly and allied nations, insisting upon verifiable
arms control and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
and fostering sustained peaceful development.
3. Promoting economic growth and sustainable development by
fostering free and open market, trade liberalization, deregulation,
privatization, and market based structural reform.
4. Addressing global problems of environmental deregulation, narcotics
trafficking, terrorism and the other criminal activities by increasing
cooperation with allies, friends, and traditional adversaries.
5. Meeting urgent humanitarian needs by supporting private and
governmental efforts, and by promoting economic reform and
resolution of local conflicts. 10
U.S. Security Assistance Programs are comprised of the following seven
major components. 11 All procurement of military equipment from the United
10
Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, The Management of Security Assistance ,
p. 5, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH, Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, 1994.
"David J. Schumacher, p. 41.
9
States Government to other nations falls within the realm of one of the seven SA
programs.
12
1. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Foreign Military Construction
Program - eligible governments purchase defense articles, services
and training from the U.S. Government.
2. Foreign Military Sales Financing Program - credits and loan
repayment guarantees are provided for the direct procurement of
arms.
3. Commercial Sales - sales by U.S. firms directly to foreign buyers.
4. International Military Education and Training Program (IMET) -
military education and training aid given in the United States or at
overseas facilities on a grant aid basis.
5. Economic Support Fund - provides loans for economic support and
technical assistance development projects.
6. Peacekeeping - operations providing funds for international security
forces such as the United Nations.
7. Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund - provides funds for the
nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Aimed at assisting
the republics of the former Soviet Union in the dismantling and
destruction of their nuclear weapons.
C. THE FMS PROCESS
The U.S. Security Assistance Program serves as a fundamental instrument
for achieving U.S. foreign policy objectives. Before a transfer of any U.S. defense
articles or services can be made to any foreign country or international
organization, the President must formally find that such assistance will strengthen
U.S. security and promote world peace. 13
In order that U.S. security assistance plans may complement a country's
own military plans and budgets, there should be ongoing consultations during the
12
Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, The Management of Security Assistance,
p. 36, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio: Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, 14th
Edition, 1994.
^International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 1996, section 3.
10
planning process between U.S. and host country representatives. Such discussions
are conducted primarily between U.S. Security Assistance Office (SAO) personnel
and Ministry of Defense officials in the host country. These discussions, covering
material acquisition programs, training plans, and related security assistance
matters, generally provide the basic input phase of the FMS sales process. 14
1. Letter of Request (LOR)
Although the process for negotiating and implementing an FMS program
can vary widely, depending to the nature of a country's request, there are
guidelines to be followed.
Determination of the U.S. approved channels of submission for the Letter of
Request (LOR) is the first step in this process. A LOR is a request from an
eligible FMS participant country for the purchase of U.S. defense articles and
services. The channels used are based upon whether the request is for "Significant
Military Equipment (SME)" or for "All other FMS (non-SME)" requirements.
SME are items designated in the International Traffic in Arms Regulation that
warrant special export controls because of their capacity for substantial military
utility. Requests for defense equipment (any item of Significant Mihtary
Equipment having a non-recurring research and development cost of more than
$50 million or a total production cost of more than $200 million) are treated as
requests for SME. Figure 1 diagrams the two channels of submission for an
LOR. 15
Before any further action is taken on the LOR, it must be validated to insure
the potential customer is eligible for FMS, that the article or service sought may be
sold.
14
David Schumacher, p. 147.
15
Ibid. p. 149.
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Figure 1. Two Channels of Request for Significant Military Equipment (SME)
12
2. Requests for SME
Requests to purchase SME which originate in-country should be transmitted
by the U.S. Embassy to the SAO. These requests must be addressed to the
cognizant DoD component. Requests to purchase SME which originate with
purchasing country representatives in the United States should also be addressed to
the cognizant Department of Defense (DoD). 16 The U.S. Embassy provides an
assessment of the proposed sale to include a statement of the reason the nation
desires the weapon systems and the anticipated reaction of neighboring nations.
3. All Other FMS (non-SME)
Requests originating in the purchasing country should be transmitted either
by the customer country's authorized representative or the DoD element of the
U.S. country team directly to the cognizant DoD component. Requests originated
by foreign representatives of the customer country in the U.S. should be sent
directly to the cognizant DoD component.
D. U.S. GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS
The U.S. Security Assistance program has its roots in U.S. public laws
which contain security assistance authorizations, appropriations, restrictions and
reporting requirements. The roles of the three branches of the U.S. Federal
Government with respect to security assistance are as follows;
1. Executive Branch
The Constitution of the U.S. establishes the President as the nation's chief
executive and, it is the President who presents the recommended annual U.S.
assistance program and budget to the Congress for its consideration and execution
once it becomes law.
As the chief executive, the President is responsible for all of the activities
of the Executive Branch. While carrying out all these activities, the President has
16
Ibid. p. 147.
13
numerous assistants, cabinet officers, and other subordinate officials to oversee the
conduct of the U.S. security assistance program. Figure 2 shows the U.S.
Government organization for Security Assistance.
17
2. Legislative Branch
The Congress of the U.S., as provided by the U.S. Constitution, is vested
with all legislative powers. In terms of security assistance, congressional power
and influence are exerted in several ways:
1. Development, consideration, and action on legislation to establish or
amend basic security assistance authorization acts.
2. Enactment of appropriations acts.
3
.
Joint Continuing Resolutions
.
4. Conduct of hearings and investigations.
5. Ratification of treaties which may have security assistance
implications.
18
The work of preparing and receiving legislation is performed largely by
committees (and their staffs) of both Houses of Congress. The primary
committees of Congress with security assistance legislation responsibility are:
a. Authorizations
House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Relations; and,
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.
b. Appropriations
House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations
(Subcommittee on Foreign Operations); and, Senate Committee on Appropriations
(Subcommittee on Foreign Operations).
17
Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, The Management of Security Assistance,
p. 76, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio: Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, 14th
Edition, 1994.
18
Ibid. p. 75.
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Figure 2. United States Government Organization for Security Assistance
15
c Other
At times, other committees such as those on Armed Services,
Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs might also become involved with Security
Assistance implications.
3. Judicial Branch
Normally, the courts have had limited involvement in the security
assistance activities. However, statutory "legislative veto" gives the Supreme
Court of the U.S. the power of invalidating clauses of the Arms Export Control
Act (AECA).
E. SECURITY ASSISTANCE (SA) RELATED TO AUTHORIZATION
AND APPROPRIATION ACTS
Security Assistance (SA) programs must be authorized by the Government
for funding and the funds must be appropriated. Those authorization and
appropriation acts related with SA are as follows;
1. Authorization Acts
The main laws related with U.S. SA programs are: (1) the Foreign
Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961 as amended, and (2) the Arms Export Control Act
(AECA) as amended.
a. The Foreign Assistance Act (FAA)
FAA authorizes legislation for a wide variety of foreign assistance
programs including IMET, overseas assistance program management, and transfer
of excess defense articles (EDA).
b. The Arms Export Control Act (AECA)
This act was known as the Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968
(FMSA). The title is changed to AECA by the International Security Assistance
and Arms Export Control Act of 1976. The AECA provides the regulations for the
conduct of FMS/FML funding.
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2. Appropriations Act
Appropriations for Security Assistance are included in the annual " Foreign
Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act" for each
year.
F. CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION
By the AECA, the President is required to notify the Congress of certain
defense trade export applications prior to their approval. The FMS and
commercial export sale review provisions are shown in Figure 3. 19
1. Foreign Military Sales/Leases
The AECA requires that, before issuing a letter of offer to sell or lease
agreement to:
1. Lease defense articles or services for $50 million or more, or
2. Any design and construction services for $200 million or more, or
3. Major defense equipment for $14 million or more,
The President must submit a certification to the Congress. The LOA or
lease agreement can be issued by the Government, if the Congress does not adopt
an objection within 30 calendar days after receiving such certification. However,
if an inuninent requirement, in the national security interest of the U.S., exists for
the lease the Government might start the process without waiting 30 days and the
on
President states this requirement in his certification.
In order to provide the Congress with sufficient time to review such cases,
the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) has agreed to provide the
Congress with 20 days advance notification of such cases prior to the formal
submission of the 30 day statutory notification.
19
Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, The Management of Security Assistance ,
p. 62, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio: Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, 14th
Edition, 1994.
20
Public Law 94-329, June 30, 1976, section 61-64.
21
U.S. Department of Defense, DoD 5101.38M Military Assistance and Sales Manual , November
1992.
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An exception to the above procedure exists for NATO countries, Japan,
Australia, and New Zealand. The formal statutory notification period for these
countries is 15 days, and the advance notification is not required.
2. Congressional Joint Resolutions
The mechanism for the rejection of proposals by the legislative power is
known as joint resolutions. Joint resolution is a statement of disapproval of a
proposed sale, transfer, or lease, which is passed by simple majority votes in both
the Senate and the House of Representatives.
Such a joint resolution must be sent to the President for review and
approval. Since the President is unlikely to approve the rejection of an action
which his Administration originally proposed to Congress, the President will likely
veto such a joint resolution, returning it to Congress.
Unless Congress is able to override the President's veto by obtaining a two-
thirds majority vote in each House in support of the original resolution of
rejection, the sale, transfer, or lease will be permitted. However, if Congress can
muster sufficient votes to override the President's veto, the proposed sale, transfer,
or lease would not be permitted.
H. SUMMARY
As the importance of deterrence has been extended beyond the borders of
the countries and pacts have become important organizations to counter the threat,
especially after the World War II, the rate of arming has dramatically increased
throughout the world. The U.S. started the mutual partnership and cooperation in
the 40' s by an aid plan known as the " Marshall Plan" which is an extension of the
Truman Doctrine.
Since then, the U.S. has remained the undisputed leader in arms sales and
aid through the Security Assistance program. As being one of those countries
19
which is in close partnership and cooperation with U.S., Turkey now ranks third in
a list of countries to accept aid from the Security Assistance program.
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III. THE U.S. NAVY TRANSFER PROGRAM AND "PERRY"
CLASS FRIGATE TRANSFER PROCESS TO TURKEY
A. THE U.S. NAVY SHIP TRANSFER PROGRAM
1. General
Transfer of the U.S. Navy ships to other countries is made using the FMS
Security Assistance program. This includes every type of transfer such as, sales,
leases, loans and grants.
The fact is, transfer of ships to a foreign country not only strengthens
mutual cooperation between the U.S. and that country, but also serves as a future
economical investment for both sides.
As being one of the most expensive systems, transfer of frigate size
warships is a difficult task for any country even for the U.S. Especially in 1996,
where economic considerations became more important as resources in the Federal
budget became more scare for defense expenses. Because of budget constraints,
the life cycle costs for ships and similar systems are being reduced. So far this has
been accomplished by either using the systems beyond their normal life cycles or
using similar equipment to reduce the cost of logistic support such as cost of
spares, maintainability, etc. The Turkish Navy is basically composed of warships
either transferred from U.S. or built in Germany/Turkey under German ship-
building technology and license. Even those built under German license use U.S.
weapon systems. As most of those systems are accepted as " standard" systems in
NATO, most NATO countries either transfer them from the U.S. or build them
under license of the U.S. companies. The concerns mentioned above drive the
U.S. Navy policy for the transfer of ships.
2. Ship Transfer Policies
The transfer of U.S. Navy ships to foreign countries occur either through
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) or Foreign Military Lease (FML) procedures.
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Although the preferred procedure is to sell the ships, leasing of ships may also
occur for national security reasons for a temporary period or if the FMS criteria
couldn't be met. The policies for the cost and other aspects, such as required
repairs for those ships to be transferred, training of the foreign crew, for the
transfer of the ships are as follows.
a. Cost
As a USN policy, the transfer of ships to other nations should be no
cost to the U.S. Government. So, all costs related with the transfer will be paid by
the receiving country. However, the costs required for the maintenance of the
ship, prior to the transfer, will be funded by the U.S. Navy's budget. This cost
does not include any overhaul reactivation, modernization, repair, or non-routine
maintenance (like painting of the ship) which take place after the foreign country's
official request for the transfer of the ships. Funds for these or similar costs are
provided by the recipient country. The costs for the delivery of the ship(s) to the
foreign location including personnel, and operation costs are also receiving
country's expense.
The expenses of the foreign country are showed in the Letter of
Offer and Acceptance and stated to be recovered through FMS procedures.
b. Routine and Other Than Routine Maintenance Repairs
The routine costs of holding and maintaining a ship before the
transfer of title to the foreign country are the USN's responsibility and these costs
will come from U.S. Navy Appropriations.
No modernization, or non-routine repair work (which will only be
for the foreign government) will be started without the notification of and, where
applicable, approval of the transfer by congress. Receipt and deposit of foreign
government funds and issuance of fund authorization documents to the related
Naval activities, is also required before work begins. However, an exception can
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occur if the foreign country accepts an FMS Case for the work and takes the risk
that the transfer may not occur.
c The Training and Documentation
Training of the foreign crew and required documentation will be
required for safe and effective operations of the ship and its equipment. Training
can not include the teaching of tactics. Tactical publications, operations plans,
orders and directives are not transferred with the ship. The requirement for the
tactical documentation by the foreign country is available only if authorized for
release. These types of documents are provided by the Navy International Policy
Office (Navy IPO) separately.
3. The Transfer Authorities
The main coordination authorities for all transfers of USN ships are the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), the Secretary of the Navy
(SECNAV), and the Department of State. These offices have decision authority
after the satisfaction of statutory Congressional oversight requirements. Other
than these coordination authorities, the main organizations which play a major role
during the transfer ofUSN ships are mentioned below.
a. The Navy International Programs Office (IPO)
The Navy IPO is the organization which is responsible for ship
transfer program planning, implementation, and execution. The Navy IPO works
under the authority, direction, and control of the SECNAV, the Assistant Secretary
of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition ASN(RDA), and Deputy
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for International Policy DSN(IP). The Navy IPO
acts as the USN primary point of contact for the representatives of the customer
(foreign country) and coordinates the decisions related to the transfer plan. The
authorization of the use ofFMS funds are also made by the IPO.
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b. The ChiefofNaval Operations (CNO)
The disposition of ships, identification of ships to be transferred, and
obtaining appropriate approval to offer ships are the main responsibilities of the
CNO.
c. Implementing Agent
The implementing agent is the organization which;
1. Prepares the ship(s) for transfer,
2. Coordinates training,
3. Provides logistics support.
The Implementing Agent for ship transfers is either the Commander
in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFLT) or the Commander in Chief, U.S.
Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT). The Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command
(COMNAVSEASYSCOM) is also another implementing agent for the transfer of
inactive ships.
4. Methodology of Ship Transfers
Transfer planning is established and a transfer method is decided after the
determination of some aspects and considerations. The main factors in
determining which method of transfer will be used are:
1
.
The USN ship retirement plans,
2. The requests and requirements of the foreign country,
3. The time available.
In addition, the number and availability of foreign training needs, time
required to get LOAs/funding in place, are some other events that must be
considered when selecting a transfer method.
There are two basic FMS/FML ship transfer methods which are the results
of common experience over the last several decades. Each of these methods has
different sub-methods based on different aspects. The methods reflect the range of
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service and support requirements together with the available funding. The transfer
methods are;
1. Hot Ship Transfer Method,
a. Without an industrial availability,
b. With follow-on industrial availability,
2. Cold Ship Transfer Method,
a. As is, where is,
b. With minimal reactivation,
c. With full reactivation.
5. The Transfer Process
From the initiation of the transfer to the physical transfer of the ship(s) to
the foreign country, the ship transfer process requires a series of actions which
take an important amount of time beside the complex procedures to be followed.
The transfer requires a coordination not only between the parties but among the
various U.S. governmental organizations. The planning and preparation of the
ship for transfer begins way before the final authorization for the transfer. A flow
chart of the ship transfer process is shown in Figures 4a and 4b.
a. Ship Disposition Review (SDR)
The first step in the ship transfer process is the decision of
inactivation of excess ships in U.S. Navy inventory. An annual meeting is held to
review:
1. The retention status of mobilization,
2. Ships presently headed for FMS/FML,
3. All ships scheduled for decommissioning/deactivation for the next
seven fiscal years.
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(Continued on Figure 4b)
Figure 4a. Transfer Process
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Figure 4b. Transfer Process (Cont.)
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The SDR will determine:
1. Which of these ships should remain or be scheduled for retention as
mobilization assets,
2. Which should be made available for FMS or FML,
3. Which should be scrapped. The SDR results go to CNO for
approval.
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b. The Ship Offer Process
Existing foreign country requests for ship transfers from the U.S.
Navy are processed after the approval of the SDR by the CNO. Navy IPO and
OPNAV are the two responsible organizations to initiate the process of offering
ships to foreign countries.
(1) Foreign Government Requests. These requests are
either in the form of formal written documents to the U.S. Government or informal
verbal exchanges occurring during the official visits of high level authorities.
(2) Ship Transfer Offers Approval. The document used
to obtain approval of which countries will be offered specific ships is drafted and
coordinated by OPNAV. It is a memorandum to SECNAV with an accompanying
memo for SECNAV to sign out to the SECDEF.
(3) CNO to CNO Formal Ship Offer. Upon approval by
SECDEF to extend offers, OPNAV will draft a letter to the foreign country CNO
(or equivalent), in coordination with the Navy IPO. This letter will be signed by
CNO and forwarded through Security Assistance channels. This letter normally
includes the following points related with the offer:
1. Specification of the ships offered.
2. States that the transfer is subject to congressional approval.
3. States that the Navy IPO will contact their government representative
to provide background information, set up a ship inspection visit,
host a conference to discuss transfer details and discuss costs.
"Department of the Navy, OPNAVIST 4770.SF, May 29, 1991.
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(4) Navy IPO Letter to Inspect Ships and Receive
Transfer Briefing. Following the offer, the Navy IPO works with appropriate
systems command organizations to develop a schedule that will allow inspections
of ships and follow up formal technical briefings in an orderly fashion over the
next 6-8 months. After the Navy IPO informally discusses a proposed schedule
with the local foreign Embassy or their formal authorities, a Letter of Invitation
(LOI) is submitted to the foreign country. The ship visit information is then sent
to the foreign office considered most appropriate by the Navy IPO to facilitate the
process, with copies to other key organizations.
After acceptance of the visit/briefing offer by the foreign
government, the Navy IPO sends a message to the various activities that will be
implementing or supporting the transfer program. It will outline the
inspection/formal briefing schedule, provide a rough agenda, and solicit
ideas/suggestions from the supporting activities. The message will request points
of contact within each organization to facilitate visit/briefing arrangements and any
schedule adjustments that may become necessary. Additional information is
included to help with planning.
c. Ship Inspections and Briefings
(1) Inspections. Each ship offered for transfer is required
to be physically inspected by the foreign country officials so that the foreign
government representatives can assess the physical condition of the ships. It also
serves to introduce the custodial activity to the foreign Navy and the FMS/FML
transfer process. The inspections are normally held at fleet locations.
(2) Briefings. Following the ship(s) inspections, formal
transfer briefings will be held at Navy IPO/NAVSEASYSCOM within the
following one or two days. These briefings are held to:
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1.
Outline the transfer process in detail,
2. Establish a general transfer plan,
3. To discuss technical details on the key systems and equipment on the
ships together with the available training and follow-on support.
Information gathered during these exchanges will be
important in the development of lease/sale agreements, the transfer plan and LOAs
used to provide services/support.
(3) Formal Country Commitment. The Navy IPO will
solicit a formal commitment from the foreign government that they are interested
in pursuing the ship transfer. Normally, the country response is in the form of an
LOR. Having seen the ships and been presented with the facts and costs
associated with the sale or lease, each foreign government must decide if they have
the assets necessary to succeed.
d. Congressional Process and Initiation ofthe Transfer
The actual implementation of the transfer by the Navy IPO, follows
the progress mentioned in the above paragraphs. The main steps in this phase are,
to assign an Implementation Agent, obtain the Congressional approval, and
develop the LOAs which are required to support the transfer.
(1) The Implementing Agent and Timetable. Although
the assignment of the Implementing Agent is generally clear prior to the formal
ship transfer briefings, the official assignment normally comes after the foreign
government confirms their commitment to continue the transfer. The Navy EPO
announces the assignment with a general outline of the transfer timetable.
(2) Congressional Notification/Legislation. One of the
most important stages in the process is obtaining of Congressional approval for the
ship transfer. The Congressional requirements and legislative procedures are stated
in Title 10, U.S. Code, Article 7307 (The basic provisions of this public law are
shown in Figure 5). The information is also found in Chapter 2 of the Security
Assistance Management Manual (SAMM).
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NOTIFICATION
Ship < 3000 Tons
And
> 20 Years Old
NAVY IPO MEMO REQUESTS
CONGRESSIONAL
LEGISLATION/NOTIFICATION
LEGISLATION
Ship > 3000 Tons
or
< 20 Years Old
Figure 5. Title 10, U.S. Code, Article 7307
(a) Legislation. According to article 7307 (b)(1), a
Naval vessel that is in excess of 3000 light tons or less than 20 years of age may
not be transferred to another nation, unless approved by law and enacted by
Congress. Congressional clearance starts with committee actions undertaken by:
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the House Foreign Affairs Committee,
the Senate Armed Services Committee, the House Armed Services Committee, and
other committees with oversight interest. When all of these political hearings are
completed, the proposed bill is voted on by the House and Senate. Finally, with
the signature of the President, enacting legislation is completed. The main
disadvantage to this process is that enacting legislation can take 5-7 months or
longer.
(b) Notification. Under article 7307(b)(2), a Naval
vessel that is less than 3000 light tons and greater than 20 years old may be
transferred only after the SECNAV has notified Congress in writing of the
proposal transfer and 30 days of continuous session of Congress have expired
without legislation objecting to the proposed transfers.
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B. BACKGROUND ON SHIP TRANSFERS TO TURKEY
By the end of the cold war, nearly all of the western countries reconsidered
the size and role of their armed forces with respect to the new order of the world
and threat perceptions. As an outcome of this analysis, in late 1991 NATO also
started a new force structure buildup and established close relations with the
former "Warsaw Pact" countries. While the global war scenarios were losing
their importance to the regional conflict scenarios (uncertainties and
unpredictabilities), armed forces were changing to adopt themselves to the new
missions and tasks of the new order.
Turkey was and still is one of NATO's most important members. Turkey is
physically located in the most sensitive geographical location of the globe. This
geographical importance along with the new order of the world directed Turkey to
modernize its armed forces as:
1. Mobile,
2. Less manpower oriented, and
3
.
Powerful enough to counter any aggression which might occur in her
area of responsibility to the extent of her area of interest.
The Turkish Navy's main forces are divided into Surface Action Groups
which consist of frigates and destroyers. The frigates consist of the MEKO-200
class frigates (accepted as one of the most capable frigates of the modern naval
forces throughout the world) which were built in Germany and Turkey, and Knox
class ex-US frigates. The destroyers are ex-US Gearing class destroyers (build
during the World War II era) which completed their useful lives decades ago.
C. THE INITIATION OF THE "PERRY" TRANSFER TO TURKEY
The idea of transferring Perry class frigates to Turkey goes back to 1994. It
was first mentioned by Admiral J. M. Boorda, CNO of U.S. at the time, in his
official letter to Admiral Vural Bayazit, Commander-in-Chief, Turkish Naval
Forces in November 21, 1994. In his letter Admiral Boorda offered to transfer
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USS ANTRIM (FFG 20) and USS FLATLEY (FFG 21) to Turkey, subject to
Congressional approval.
In response to that offer and after several correspondences between the two
Navy Headquarters, these ships were inspected by a Turkish team on January
1995, and following this inspection, the U.S. Navy was notified that Turkish Navy
was interested in the transfer of those ships to Turkey.23 During the negotiations, a
third ship, USS SPRAGUE (FFG 16) was also offered by the U.S. Navy on April
1995 and this ship was also inspected by a Turkish team the same month and the
transfer of this ship also accepted by the Turkish Navy. The initiation of the
transfer process is shown on Figure 6.
D. TRANSFER PROCESS
1. Work Definition Conferences (WDC)
a. The first conference between the two parties was held in July
1995. In this meeting, the issues related to the transfer of FFG 16 were mentioned
and the following decisions were reached:
1. Reactivation will start on July 19, 1995,
2. The required resources will be transferred,
3. A Turkish team will be sent to U.S. to participate in the reactivation
process.
As a result of this conference, a Turkish crew was sent to Norfolk in July
1995 to help reactivation of the USS SPRAGUE (which was named TCG
GAZIANTEP by the Turkish Navy).
b. The second conference between the two parties took place in
August 1995. During this conference the U.S. officials stated that, the
Congressional approval was expected on October 16, 1995 and the transfer
ceremony could be held on October 18, 1995. The dates of the rest of the Turkish
crew's arrival and reactivation work schedule was revised by Turkey to meet those
dates.
"Letter by CINC Turkish Navy, dated January 24, 1995.
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Letter from the USN CNO Adm. Boorda
to the Turkish Navy CNO Adm. Bayazit
November 21, 1994
r~~
:
TurkishTeam Inspection of
USS ANTRIM and USS FLATLEY
January 1995
Letter of Acceptance from
the CINC Turkish Navy
January 24, 1995
Offer of USS C.SPRAGUE
as the third ship by the USN
April 1995
TurkishTeam Inspection of
USS C.SPRAGUE
April 1995
Figure 6. Initiation of the Transfer Process
c. The other issues negotiated during these conferences and
follow-up meetings were as follows:
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1. Ships will be transferred in "hot ship" status.
2. The required training for the crew was planned and the training
courses started by September 1995.
3. The transfer port will be Pensacola. 24
4. The Ship Alteration Repair Program (SARP) documents for the first
two ships are told to be completed by February 1996.25
d. The third WDC was held on February 1996. In this meeting
the important issues discussed and the results of the meeting are briefly given
below:
1. The Defense Authorization Bill became Public Law on February 10,
1996. U.S. authorities stated that the transfer could occur as early as
the end of March 1996 unless it was disapproved by a joint
resolution of the Congress.
2. Ships will be moved to Pensacola in early March 1996.
3. Ships will be transferred in "Hot Ship" status as it was stated in
previous meetings.
4. The Turkish crew of the first two ships will start to be sent by March
1996 and these personnel will get Underway Team Training (UTT)
in order to get ready to take over the ships after the transfer
ceremony.
5. After the transfer of the ships to Turkey, ships will move to Norfolk
for Refresher Training and a short maintenance.
2. Legislative and Congressional Process and Outcomes
The frigate legislation was submitted to the Congress as an attachment to
the Defense Appropriations Bill for 1996. The legislation also included ship
transfers to the Governments of Bahrain, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates.
Because the Appropriations Bill was delayed the U.S. Department of Defense was
being funded on a continuing resolution through November 13, 1995. The transfer
process is shown in Figures 7a and 7b.
24,
Office of Defense Cooperation/Turkey (ODC/TU), NAD/SURF/549 (12-8b), December 15,
1996.
25
Office of Defense Cooperation/Turkey (ODC/TU), NAD/SURF/030 (12-8b), January 22, 1996.
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July 1995
*
Turkish crew for US C.SPRAUGE
arrived at Norfolk
July 1995
*
Second WDC Conference
August 1995
*
Offer of USS C.SPRAGUE
as the third ship by the USN
April 1 995
*
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September 1995
The Bill Pased both Chambers
December 1995
(Continued on Figure 7b.)
Figure 7a. Transfer Process
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Figure 7b. Transfer Process (Cont.)
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At this time, there were differences between the Senate version of the bill
and House version. The Senate version of the bill approved the transfer of the
frigates as a grant under the Southern Region Amendments (SRA).26 However, the
House version required that the frigates be transferred as either a lease or a sale.
The requirement for 30 day statutory notifications to Congress were waived
in previous transfer legislation. Indications were that the waiver would not be
allowed for the FFG-7 transfer package, the Navy International Programs Office
(IPO) was advised to plan on the 30 day notification requirements. The IPO had
prepared the required documentation, and was ready to forward authority to DSAA
for processing as soon as the transfer legislation was signed.
In December 1995, the bill passed both chambers of Congress after it was
recommended by the Defense Appropriations Act Conference Committee which
stated that USS ANTRIM (FFG 20) and USS SPRAGUE (FFG 16) would be
transferred on a grant basis while USS FLATLEY (FFG 21) would be leased.
After the Defense Appropriations Bill of 1996, which the frigate legislation
was attached to, passed both Chambers on December 19, 1995, it became Public
Law on February 10, 1996.
Official notification to the Congress was provided on March 29, 1996 by
the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA). 29 The transfer of the ships to
Turkey was legalized following the 30-day period.
During the 30 day notifications period, in their letter dated 11 April 1996,
the U.S. Navy EPO stated that their best estimate for when the ships will be
available for transfer was 15 May 1996. Following this information, the Turkish
26
National Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (Placed in the Senate) Sec. 1012.
27
National Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (Introduced in the House), HR 2348
m.
28DoN, Navy International Programs Office, 4920 Ser 262C/5U601726, dated November 8, 1995.
29
Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA), letter Ser 1-01866/96, March 29, 1996.
30
Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA), letter Ser 1-02347/96, March 29, 1996.
31
Public Law 84-1028 (Title 10, United States Code) Chapter 633.
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Navy authorities notified the U.S. Navy IPO that 17 May 1996 and 20 May 1996
were suitable for the conduct of transfer ceremonies. In order to participate to the
transfer ceremonies and to participate in the Underway Team Training (UTT),
more than 100 of the crew for the two frigates, USS ANTRIM (FFG-20) and USS
FLATLEY (FFG-21) were sent to USA on May 9, 1996. These crew participated
in UTT, including underway training about two days a week, and also live firing
training for one month.
Following the notification to the Congress, the transfer process
unexpectedly slowed down. Although the legal 30 day period was completed
without any objection from the Congress, the information exchange between the
two governments, related to the transfer of the frigates, was unexpectedly slowed
down at this stage with exception of some letter exchanges at the Ministerial level.
In his letter to the Turkish Minister of National Defense Oltan Sungurlu, dated 17
May 1996, the U.S. Secretary of Defense William J. Perry stated that "...we have
been faced with a negative reaction from some members of Congress which has
delayed Congressional approval of transfers. . . ,"
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Meanwhile, it was heard that Senator Paul Sarbanes (D-MD), a Greek-
American, had brought an issue to the Senate stating that this transfer will escalate
tensions in the Aegean sea between Turkey and Greece. Senator Sarbanes, a stout
ally of his ancestral home, enlisted the help of his collegues to block the
transfers.
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Following that unexpected development, the Turkish Minister of Foreign
Affairs Office authorities were informed by their counter U.S. officials that the
technical and logistical process for the transfer of the ships will be terminated until
further notice.
32
Letter from the U.S. Secretary of Defense William J. Perry to the Turkish Minister of National
Defense Oltan Sungurlu dated May 17, 1996.
33
Jack Dorsey, "Turkey Might Not Get Promised Ships," the Virginian-Pilot (Norfolk, VA),
August 8, 1996.
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Although no official explanation was provided to the knowledge of the
author of this thesis, the military confrontation occurred between Turkey and
Greece over sovereignty of a disputed islet in the Aegean Sea called "Kardak"
during the last week of 1995 had an important input to this development, as the
coming year (1996) was an election year in the U.S.
Following these unexpected delays, all of the Turkish crew sent for training
and transfer ceremonies returned to Turkey by August 1996.
The transfer of the three ex-U.S. frigates (an important opportunity for the
modernization efforts ofNATO forces in the southern flank, which was started by
the CNO ofUSN and CINC of the Turkish Navy nearly two years ago) was left to
a further time.
E. SUMMARY
The transfer of U.S. Navy ships to foreign countries mainly occurs through
Foreign Military Sales (FMS). As a policy, the transfer of the ships to other
nations should be at no cost to the U.S. Government. However, the maintenance
of the ship prior to the transfer is funded by the U.S. Navy's budget. The ship
transfers are initiated by Navy International Programs Office (IPO) and OPNAV
after the approval of the Ship Disposition Review (SDR). After the approval by
SECDEF to extend the transfer offers, the formal ship offer is made by a letter
from the USN CNO to the foreign navy CNO. This offer is subject to the
Congressional approval.
The offer of transferring three Perry class frigates to Turkey was initiated
on November 1994 with a letter from the USN CNO to the CINC of Turkish Navy.
The Congressional notification of this transfer was provided to the Congress on
March 29, 1996 by the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA). The transfer
of the ships were approved following the required waiting period of 30 days
without any objection from the Congress. The estimated transfer date was 15 May
1996; however, the process slowed down unexpectedly around mid 1996 and the
transfer has not occurred yet.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE TRANSFER PROCESS
WITH RESPECT TO THE FMS PROCEDURES
A. INITIATION OF THE TRANSFER PROCESS
A letter of offer was drafted by OPNAV in coordination with the Navy IPO,
signed by the USN CNO, on November 21, 1994. This letter was forwarded to the
CESTC of the Turkish Navy. This offer to undertake the ship offer had included
several points:
1. Identified the specific ships offered.
2. Defined the contacts for inspection visits and,
3. Most important of all, it stated that the offer was subject to
Congressional approval.
This letter of offer was procedurally in line with the process required by the
Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM). The corresponding letter by
the Turkish Authorities, dated 28 November, 1994, stated the Turkish Navy's
interest in the offer and would accept the frigates subject to the results of the
inspections by Turkish officials. This letter was signed by The CINC of the
Turkish Navy and this was also procedurally correct.
B. SHIP INSPECTIONS AND TURKEY'S FORMAL COMMITMENT
Although the normal process states that, after the Navy IPO works with
NAVSEACOM, INACTSHIPSCOM NAVSUPSYSCOM, NETSAFA and
appropriate systems command organizations, the IPO develops a schedule that will
allow inspections of ships and follow up formal technical briefings in an orderly
fashion over the next 6-8 months. In this case, the inspections were able to start in
two months. This shortened period had no negative impact on the process, but
accelerated progress and helped both navies transfer information while the ships
were still in hot ship status. Also, the formal transfer briefings were held
following the inspections, and an agreement reached between the parties at the
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conclusion of these meetings in the second half of January 1995. At this stage, the
process was going well and was ahead of schedule.
C. REVISION OF THE TRANSFER AGREEMENT
At the beginning of 1995, the Turkish Navy stated their interest in the
transfer of another Perry class frigate under FMS. Although this third ship was on
active duty at that time, the decision was made to deactivate it in a short time.
The accelerated response and decision process for the transfer of this third
ship was important because, if the transfer was made available before the
deactivation, this would save money, which could be spent for reactivation.
Following the legal process similar to that of the first two ships, the third
ship was included in the same transfer package approved on April 1995 and the
reactivation requirement for this ship was prevented. By the second half of 1995,
the transfer process was on track and progress was better than expected.
D. CONGRESSIONAL PROCESS
1. Transfer Authorization Bills
The authorization for the transfer of the frigates to Turkey, with other ship
transfers to other countries, was introduced in the House and Senate of the 104th
Congress as an attachment to the Defense Appropriations Bill for 1996.
a. The Bill in the House ofRepresentatives
The bill in the House of Representatives, (numbered HR 2348 and
dated September 18, 1995) gave the Secretary of the Navy authorization to transfer
the three frigates to Turkey. The transfers were going to be as either a lease or a
sale. The expiration of authority of the bill was stated as after two years beginning
on the date of the enactment of the Act.
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b. The Bill in the Senate
Similar to the bill presented in the House, the Senate version of the
bill (S. 1026/1995) was placed at about the same time. There were no major
differences between the two bills, however, the Senate version of the bill stated
that the transfers were to be made by grant status.
c. Enactment ofthe Defense Appropriations Bill
The bills passed both chambers of the Congress on December 19,
1995. The difference was solved by stating that two ships were going to be
transferred on a grant basis, the third on a lease basis. The bill became Public Law
on February 10, 1996. The consensus reached in the Congress and the positive
progress achieved in the legislative branch was proof that the transfer process was
going well.
2. Congressional Notification
The Appropriations Bill of 1996, which included the transfer legislation,
was delayed nearly four months. During this period, however, the transfer process
carried on and the required preparations were made to avoid further delays. Any
delay would cause additional expenses for either the maintenance of the ships or
for the accommodation of the Turkish crew who were sent for training.
The Navy International Programs Office (IPO) had prepared the required
documentation for the notification of the transfer for Congressional approval and
was ready to forward authority to DSAA for processing as soon as the bill became
Public Law.
Once the bill became Public Law, the official notification was provided to
Congress on March 29, 1996. This notification was signed by Mr. H. Dlehl
McKalip, the Acting Director of the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA).
The notification was sent to the following Committees in the Congress:
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1. House Committee on Appropriations
2. House Committee on National Security
3. House Committee on International Relations
4. House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations
5. Senate Committee on Appropriations
6. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
7. Senate Committee on Armed services
8. Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations.
Following this notification, the 30 working day waiting period was
completed without any objection from the Legislative Branch, and the transfer of
the ships was now available without further legal obligations. Everything was
going smoothly and as expected.
E. THE DISPUTE OVER THE KARDAK ISLETS IN AEGEAN SEA
As the transfer of the frigates was nearing completion, two unexpected
events, which were closely related with each other, occurred at the end of 1995
and at the beginning of 1996.
1. A Brief Explanation of the Crisis
On December 25, 1995, a Turkish cargo boat ran aground near an Aegean
islet Kardak (or Imia). The process of freeing the cargo boat and towing the ship
then became an argument between Turkey and Greece. This incident created a
dispute over the sovereignty of the Kardak islet.
On December 29, 1995, the Turkish government claimed that the island
Kardak constitutes a part of Turkish territory and that it was listed in the Registry
of Deeds of the Turkish province of Mugla. On January 10, 1996, the Greek
government rejected the Turkish claim to the islet. By the end of January 1996,
the crisis had calmed down and things returned to normal.
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2. A Bill Introduced to the U.S. Senate
On April 17, 1996, a bill was introduced to the U.S. Senate by Senator
Arlen Specter (R-PA). Mr. Specter submitted a resolution, which was referred to
the Committee on Foreign Relations, expressing the sense of the Senate regarding
a resolution of the dispute between the two countries over sovereignty to the
Kardak islet in the Aegean Sea. In the second version of this bill, dated April 19,
1996, Senator Mikulski (D-NY) joined Mr. Specter as cosponsor.
This bill expresses the sense of the Senate that the governments of Greece
and Turkey should:
1. Submit to the International Court of Justice in the Hague their
dispute over to the Kardak islet in the Aegean Sea; and
2. Agree to be bound by the Court's decision with respect to the
dispute.
Two more cosponsors were added to the bill on April 22 and June 13
respectively. These senators were Mr. Moynihan (D-NY) and Mr. Santorum (R-
PA).
The resolution mentioned above might have overshadowed domestic issues
and gains for these individuals, especially since 1996 was an election year.
However, Turkey and Greece didn't express the same interest. On the contrary,
the opinion of these countries was that the decision of going to an International
Court was a domestic issue for each country and shouldn't be influenced by a third
party.
Although the two events mentioned above were not directly related to the
transfer process, the highest executive and legislative branch authorities could
have gotten the impression that transfer of three war ships to one of these two
countries might affect their objectivity image to the public, causing a negative
impact during the approaching election campaigns. I believe it was this impression
that caused the delay in the transfer of the three frigates.
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F. THE FINAL STEP IS YET TO COME
Progress during the transfer process of three Perry class frigates to Turkey
was achieved successfully by both parties throughout the process up to the actual
transfer of the ships. The regulations were strictly followed and every decision
was agreed to by the officials of the two governments. However, unexpected and
unrelated events occurred during the transfer, halting the process. During this
research, the impression that I received was that the transfer will take place in
1997.
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V. CONCLUSION
A. CONCLUSION
During the cold war era, the U.S. ship transfer program was implemented
efficiently to provide mutual gains for trading countries. However, with the end of
the Cold War, the mutual threat was changed or re-shaped, and the U.S. sought to
downsize its military. As there was no more direct threat to U.S. sovereignty, as it
was during the Cold War, the transfer of USN excess ships (or other military
equipment) to allied nations was now drawing more attention from individual
members of both the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. Government
and they questioned the impact on their own interests.
The Turkish Navy embarked upon an intensive program to modernize its
ships to bring them in line with emerging technologies. The requirement of
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) continues to be one of the most important security
assistance programs for modernization and maintenance. The process of FMS
management in this case followed a logical sequence of steps over a prescribed
timeline. The Arms Export Control Act (AECA) provided the legal basis, for the
policies, as expected, and proved to be a sufficient document.
However, analysis of the transfer has shown that even when the regulations
and rules (which are in harmony with constitutional requirements) are followed,
individual or domestic political concerns might indirectly influence international
relations and cause unexpected outcomes or delay progress. The following
conclusions were reached after analyzing the transfer issue and the political
context of the U.S. Presidential and Congressional elections.
1. The transfer process has not yet been completed because of
unrelated events.
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2. As 1996 was an election year, the candidates were trying to
eliminate any possibility that an event might be used against them,
regardless of the legitimacy of the issue.
3. This "no risk taking" approach was the most important cause of
delays in the transfer process.
This situation is neither unique to this case nor to the U.S. political system.
This type of "foreign relations influenced by individual interests" is to be
expected in democratic systems. However, if there is evidence of this to come,
parties must officially notify each other of the situation and any possible
outcomes.
B. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The following are additional topics to research and analyze:
1. How the transfer process will be concluded?
2. What might be the long term economical and political effects if the
process is completely terminated?
Analysis of the subjects mentioned above will be helpful in better
understanding the FMS process and its relation to domestic vs. foreign political
relations.
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